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Abstract
The doctrinal paradox is analysed from a probabilistic point of view assuming a simple
parametric model for the committee’s behaviour. The well known issue-by-issue and case-
by-case majority rules are compared in this model, by means of the concepts of false positive
rate (FPR), false negative rate (FNR) and Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) space.
We introduce also a new rule that we call path-by-path, which is somehow halfway between
the other two. Under our model assumptions, the issue-by-issue rule is shown to be the best
of the three according to an optimality criterion based in ROC maps, for all values of the
model parameters (committee size and competence of its members), when equal weight is
given to FPR an FNR. For unequal weights, the relative goodness of the rules depends on
the values of the competence and the weights, in a way which is precisely described. The
results are illustrated with some numerical examples.
Keywords: Doctrinal paradox, judgement aggregation, ROC space.
1 Introduction: The doctrinal paradox
The Condorcet Jury Theorem (attributed to Condorcet [6]) states that “if n jurists act indepen-
dently, each with probability θ > 12 of making the correct decision, then the probability that
the jury (deciding by majority rule) makes the correct decision increases monotonically to 1
as n tends to infinity”. See for instance Boland [1]) and Karotkin and Paroush [13], and the
references therein, for precise statements, proofs, and extensions of this principle.
The doctrinal paradox (a name introduced by Kornhauser [14] in 1992) arises in some situations
when a committee or jury faces a compound question divided in two subquestions or premises,
P and Q. The point of interest is in deciding between the acceptance of both premises P ∧ Q
(P and Q) and the acceptance of the opposite ¬(P ∧ Q) = ¬P ∨ ¬Q (not P or not Q). In
view of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, some kind of majority rule seems appropriate for this
two-premises problem. However, in some cases, the same set of individual decisions leads to
different collective decisions depending on the manner the individual opinions are aggregated.
Classically, two standard decision procedures are considered in the literature: the case-by-case
and the issue-by-issue procedures (CbyC and IbyI, respectively, for short), see [14], [15]. In
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CbyC, each committee member or judge decides on both questions and votes P ∧ Q or ¬(P ∧
Q). Then, simple majority decides. It is also called the conclusion-based or outcome-based
aggregation criterion. In fact, it is a reduction to the one-premise Condorcet case.
In the IbyI procedure, each committee member decides P or ¬P first, and then a joint decision
about this premise is taken by simple majority. Similarly, each member chooses between Q or
¬Q, and a joint decision is taken again by simple majority. If P and Q are separately decided
by a (perhaps differently formed) majority, then P ∧ Q is proclaimed. Otherwise, ¬(P ∧ Q) is
the conclusion. The IbyI procedure is also called the premise-based aggregation criterion.
Both procedures look reasonable, but they may give rise to different results, hence the “paradox”,
as we can see in the examples of Tables 1 and 2. The first one shows a 3-member committee,
with a description of the individual member behaviour on the left, and a summary contingency
table on the right. A possible outcome of a 7-member decision is illustrated in Table 2. The
contingency table is enough to note the presence of the paradox. In both examples, the CbyC
and IbyI procedures lead to different decisions.
Members P Q P ∧Q
M1 X × ×
M2 × X ×
M3 X X X
X X ×
Q ¬Q Totals
P 1 1 2
¬P 1 0 1
Totals 2 1 3
Table 1: A doctrinal paradox with a 3-member committee. In the table on the left, symbols
X and × mean decision in favour or against the premise, respectively. The contingency table
on the right-hand side summarizes the information. The CbyC procedure leads to decide
¬(P ∧Q); the IbyI rule leads to P ∧Q.
Q ¬Q Totals
P 3 2 5
¬P 2 0 2
Totals 5 2 7
Table 2: Contingency table showing the doctrinal paradox with a 7-member committee:
There are majorities for P and Q separately, but not a conjoint majority for P ∧Q.
The contingency table for the general case of n committee members is illustrated in Table 3. We
will assume throughout the paper that n is an odd number: n = 2m+ 1, m ≥ 1. The doctrinal
paradox appears when the following conditions are simultaneously satisfied:
x+ y > m , x+ z > m , x ≤ m .
Q ¬Q Totals
P x y x+ y
¬P z t z + t
Totals x+ z y + t n
Table 3: Summary of the distribution of n votes on two premises as a contingency table.
We now introduce a new decision rule which is also reasonable and, as we will see later, lies
in some sense in between of the classical IbyI and CbyC rules. We call it path-by-path (PbyP,
2
A. Alabert — M. Farré Doctrinal paradox
for short), and it can be defined as follows: P ∧ Q is proclaimed if the number of voters that
individually decide P ∧ Q is greater than those who decide ¬P , and greater than those who
decide ¬Q, separately. That is, in the notation of Table 3, if x > z+ t and x > y+ t. Comparing
with IbyI, only the number of supporters of P ∧Q can be used to beat ¬P , without using the
votes for P ∧ ¬Q, and similarly to beat ¬Q without using the votes for ¬P ∧Q; it is therefore
a stronger requirement to conclude P ∧Q. Comparing with CbyC, in order to conclude P ∧Q,
in PbyP the votes for P ∧ Q do not need to beat the sum of all other options, but only those
who deny P and those who deny Q, separately, which is a weaker statement.
Our goal is to compare the performance of the three decision rules, for different committee
sizes and different individual competence of its members. To this end, we define a theoretical
framework consisting of a probabilistic model where the competence of a judge is defined as the
probability that he/she takes the correct decision about each single premise. It is assumed that
a “true state of nature” or “absolute truth” exists, which is one of the four possibilities that
combine P , Q and their negations.
Our performance criterion is based in the concepts of true and false positive and negative rates
and the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) space. They have their origin in the field of
electrical engineering and are commonly used in medicine, machine learning and other scientific
disciplines (see e.g. Fawcett [11] and Hand and Till [12]). We believe that its application to
the doctrinal paradox is completely new, and that with them the doctrinal paradox can be
considered “solved”. Of course, this claim has to be qualified: We mean that there is a fairly
acceptable framework to decide which one of a set of rules has to be applied to arrive to the
right conclusion. As will be apparent later, our analysis can be applied to any given set of rules,
beyond those considered here.
The problem of a committee deciding on the three logical clauses P , Q and R, with the constrain
R ⇔ P ∧ Q is only an instance of the broader situation in which a collective decision is to be
built from individual decisions in a community. The theory of judgement aggregation aims at
studying and shedding light into these kind of problems. We refer the reader to the surveys [17]
and [19] for an overview of the field and its recent developments.
The doctrinal paradox is correspondingly a particular case of a general impossibility theorem
inside that theory (see, e.g. List and Pettit [18]): Under reasonable assumptions, there exist
individual logically consistent decisions on P , Q and R that lead to collective inconsistent
decisions. One might think that the majority rule used to construct the collective decision is to
be held responsible of the impossibility; however, except in trivial cases, any other aggregation
rule (see [17] for examples) displays the same deadlock. Dietrich and List [8] prove Arrow’s
impossibility result on preference aggregation as a corollary of this impossibility in judgement
aggregation. See also Camps, Mora and Saumell [5] for a new approach to the problem of
constrained judgement aggregation in a general setting.
The concept of decision rule that we introduce in the next section is somewhat narrower than
that of aggregation rule in judgement aggregation theory, but sufficient and adapted to our
purposes. We do not go further explaining judgement aggregation theory concepts since we
focus specifically in the doctrinal paradox with a simple model of behaviour of the committee
members. For instance, we disregard strategic behaviour, considered in Dietrich and List [9]
and de Clippel and Eliaz [7], or the epistemic or behavioural perspective, studied in Bovens and
Rabinowicz [3], [4]), and Bonnefon [2]).
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we define and characterise with precision the
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IbyI, CbyC and PbyP decision rules, and explain what we consider to be an admissible rule in the
application context we are dealing with. We show that the three rules considered are admissible,
and that there exist non-admissible (though not completely irrational) decision rules.
The specific model assumptions are given in Section 3. Although the doctrinal paradox cannot
be avoided, one can speak of the “best rule”, once some theoretical model is defined and some
reasonable performance criterion is chosen. Of course, different criteria gives rise to different
“best rules”, and this is again unavoidable.
The concept of true and false positives and negatives and that of ROC space are introduced
in Section 4. Translated to our setting, the false positive rate FPR will be the probability of
accepting P ∧ Q when it is false, and the false negative rate FNR the probability of rejecting
P ∧Q when it is true.
To make the exposition smooth, we postpone the proofs of all the technical statements of Sections
2, 3 and 4 to an appendix.
Section 5 contains the main results of the paper and their proofs: Rule IbyI is the best in the
ROC setting under a symmetric criterion which gives the same weight to FPR and FNR; in case
of unequal weights, any of the three rules can be the best, depending on the relation between
the competence parameter and the specifics weights.
Section 6 contains some numerical computations and figures, showing that all values of interest
resulting from the probabilistic model can be explicitly obtained. More than that, the simple
hypotheses on the model that we impose in Section 3 can be relaxed to a great extent and
the explicit computations can still be carried out without difficulty with adequate computing
resources. This is explained in more detail in the final discussion in Section 7, together with
other considerations and open problems.
2 Decision rules
In this section, we give a detailed characterization of the IbyI, PbyP and CbyC rules outlined in
the introduction, and formalise the concept of admissible decision rule. We assume throughout
the paper that the committee size is an odd number n = 2m+1, withm ≥ 1. The simple majority
for a single binary question is therefore achieved by any number of committee members greater
than m.
Definition 2.1. Assume that the opinions of the committee are summarised as in Table 3.
Then, we define the following decision rules:
R1 : The IbyI (Issue-by-Issue) rule,
Decide P ∧Q if and only if x+ y > z + t and x+ z > y + t. (1)
R2 : The PbyP (Path-by-Path) rule,
Decide P ∧Q if and only if x > z + t and x > y + t. (2)
R3 : The CbyC (Case-by-Case) rule,
Decide P ∧Q if and only if x > y + z + t. (3)
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In the sequel, we shall use the following equivalent expressions, whose proof is straightforward
and detailed in the Appendix.
Proposition 2.2. Using the notations in Table 3, we have:
R1 : Decide P ∧Q if and only if x > m− y ∧ z. (4)
R2 : Decide P ∧Q if and only if x > m−
⌊y∧z
2
⌋
. (5)
R3 : Decide P ∧Q if and only if x > m. (6)
where bxc denotes the integer part of x, i.e. the largest integer not greater than x, and x ∧ y
stands for the minimum of x and y.
(The context will distinguish the uses of ∧ as the minimum of two values or the logical operator
‘and’.)
From the characterisation of Proposition 2.2, it is clear that the condition of rule R3 to decide
P ∧ Q is more restrictive than that of R2, and the latter in turn is more restrictive that the
condition of R1. Furthermore, rules R2 and R3 are equivalent when n = 3 or 5, and they are
different for n ≥ 7. Rules R1 and R2 are not equivalent for any n ≥ 3. These facts will be stated
as a proposition after a formal definition of decision rule:
Definition 2.3. A decision rule is a mapping from the set T of all contingency tables into {0, 1},
where 1 means deciding P ∧Q, and 0 means the opposite.
If the committee has n members, there are N =
(n+3
3
)
ways to fill the contingency table, and 2N
possible decision rules. The number N can be deduced by a combinatorial argument considering
the number of ways to express n as the sum of four integers, including zero (the so-called weak
compositions of a number).
Since we assume that P and Q must have the same relevance in the final decision, it is natural
to impose that a decision rule must yield the same result if we interchange the number of votes
for P ∧ ¬Q and Q ∧ ¬P , i.e. y and z.
Furthermore, we would like to consider only decision rules satisfying the following rationality
property: If a table leads to decision 1 and a committee member that has voted for P ∧ ¬Q or
Q∧¬P changes the vote to P ∧Q, the decision for the new table should also be 1; analogously,
if the decision was 0 and the same vote changes to ¬P ∧¬Q, then the decision for the new table
should also be 0. This condition is easily implemented by considering only rules that preserve
the partial order ≤ on T generated by the four relations
x y
z t
≤ x+ 1 y − 1
z t
x y
z t
≤ x+ 1 y
z − 1 t
x y
z t
≤ x y + 1
z t− 1
x y
z t
≤ x y
z + 1 t− 1
These considerations lead us to define the following concept of admissible rule. More often than
not, we will use the vector notation (x, y, z, t) instead of the tabular form, to save space.
Definition 2.4. A decision rule R : T −→ {0, 1} will be called an admissible rule if:
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0 0
0 3
0 1
0 2
0 1
1 1
0 2
0 1
1 0
0 2
1 1
0 1
0 2
1 0
0 3
0 0
1 2
0 0
1 1
1 0
2 0
0 1
2 1
0 0
3 0
0 0
Figure 1: The partially ordered set (T,≤) for n = 3. We have identified tables which are
transposed of each other
1. It does not distinguish between transposed tables:
R(x, y, z, t) = R(x, z, y, t) .
2. It is order-preserving on the partially ordered set (T,≤):
(x, y, z, t) ≤ (x′, y′, z′, t′)⇒ R(x, y, z, t) ≤ R(x′, y′, z′, t′) .
The resulting partial order for n = 3 is represented in Figure 1, where we have already identified
tables that merely interchange the values of y and z.
We will write R ≤ R′ whenever R(T ) ≤ R′(T ) for all tables T ∈ T, and R < R′ whenever R ≤ R′
and R 6= R′. Now, the relations among the rules R1, R2, R3 can be stated as follows:
Proposition 2.5. Rules R1, R2, R3 of Definition 2.1 are admissible and, as functions T →
{0, 1}, they satisfy R3 ≤ R2 ≤ R1.
Moreover, we have R3 = R2 < R1 for n = 3, 5, and R3 < R2 < R1 for n ≥ 7.
As an example of a non-admissible rule, consider requiring the simple majority of P ∧Q against
each one of the other options:
R0(x, y, z, t) = 1 ⇐⇒ x > y and x > z and x > t ,
Indeed, with n ≥ 5, one has (2, 1, 1, 1) < (2, 2, 1, 0), but applying R0 to both sides reverses the
inequality. This contradicts the second condition of Definition 2.4.
The relation of R0 with the other three rules can be summarised as follows: In general, R3 ≤
R2 ≤ R0. For n = 3, the relations R3 = R2 = R0 < R1 hold true, with R0 and R1 differing
on (1, 1, 1, 0). For n = 5, we have R3 = R2 < R0 < R1 with R2 and R0 differing on (2, 1, 1, 1),
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and R0 and R1 differing on (1, 2, 2, 0) and on (2, 2, 1, 0). Starting with n ≥ 7, R0 and R1 are
no more comparable (neither R0 ≤ R1 nor R1 ≤ R0), and all four rules are different. All these
relations are easily checked.
Remark 2.6. We could have started by defining an equivalence relation ∼ on T, identifying
tables
x y
z t
and x z
y t
The partial order would be shorter to define, and an admissible rule considered on the quotient
set T/ ∼ would not need condition 1 of the definition. Figure 1 implicitly uses this equivalence.
Although elegant, this setup would introduce more complications in the discussions of the next
sections.
3 Probabilistic model of committee voting
Our probabilistic model is the simplest possible, and it is described by the four conditions below.
Under these conditions, we can develop the theory of ROC optimality without unnecessary
complications, and produce comprehensible examples. As we will discuss in Section 7, these
conditions can be very much relaxed and the computations of the ROC analysis can be carried
out automatically without problems.
A framework similar to ours can be found in List [16], where the main goal is to compute the
probability of appearance of the paradox, and to investigate the behaviour of this probability
when the committee size grows to infinity, in the spirit of the classical Condorcet theorem.
We assume that a true “state of nature” exists, in which one of the four exclusive events P ∧Q,
P ∧ ¬Q, ¬P ∧Q and ¬P ∧ ¬Q is in force.
We assume the following conditions:
(C1) Odd committee size: The number of voters is an odd number, n = 2m+ 1, with m ≥ 1.
(C2) Equal competence: The probability θ of choosing the correct alternative when deciding
between P and ¬P is the same for all voters and satisfies 12 < θ < 1. The same competence
θ is assumed when deciding between Q and ¬Q.
(C3) Mutual independence among voters: The decision of each voter does not depend on the
decisions of the other voters.
(C4) Independence between P and Q: For each voter, the decision on one premise does not
influence the decision on the other.
Formally, conditions (C2)–(C4) can be rephrased by saying that for each voter k in the committee
and each clause c ∈ {P,Q}, there is a random variable that takes the value 1 if the voter believes
the clause is true, and zero otherwise, and all these variables are stochastically independent and
identically distributed. Their specific distribution depends on the true state of nature.
Under these hypotheses, we can obtain the probability of all possible distribution of votes in
a table for each given state of nature. Assume that (X,Y, Z, T ) are the random variables
representing the counts in Table 3 in the probabilistic framework just defined. As it is customary
in probability and statistics, we distinguish between random variables represented by capital
letters X,Y , etc, and their observed values, represented by small letters x, y, etc.
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Proposition 3.1. Under conditions (C1)–(C4), the joint distribution of (X,Y, Z, T ) is multi-
nomial M(n, px, py, pz, pt), with parameters depending on the true state of nature, according to
the following table:
px py pz pt
P ∧Q θ2 θ(1− θ) θ(1− θ) (1− θ)2
P ∧ ¬Q θ(1− θ) θ2 (1− θ)2 θ(1− θ)
¬P ∧Q θ(1− θ) (1− θ)2 θ2 θ(1− θ)
¬P ∧ ¬Q (1− θ)2 θ(1− θ) θ(1− θ) θ2
The proof follows immediately from the definition of the multinomial distribution and the model
assumptions, see the Appendix. Recall that the multinomial probability function is given by
P{X = k, Y = j, Z = i, T = `} =
(
n
i, j, k, `
)
pkx · pjy · piz · p`t, (7)
where k, j, i, ` are non-negative integers such that n = i + j + k + `, and
( n
i,j,k,`
)
means the
quotient of factorials n!k!·j!·i!·`! .
From the law of (X,Y, Z, T ), it is easy to compute the law of any given decision rule R : T →
{0, 1}: It will be a Bernoulli law whose parameter is simply the sum of the numbers (7) for all
tables that R maps to 1.
Notice that formula (7) is correct irrespective of the existence of a background absolute truth
or of the competence concept. It only needs independence between voters, and the existence of
a vector of probabilities (px, py, pz, pt) adding up to 1, the same for all voters, representing the
probability of opting for each of the four options. List [16] studies the probability of appearance
of the doctrinal paradox in this more general situation and shows that slightly different values
of the vector of probabilities may lead to very different values of the probability of appearance
of the paradox when n → ∞. Applied to our case, his results imply that, if P ∧Q is true, the
probability of appearance of the paradox (disagreement between IbyI and CbyC rules) tends to
0 when the competence θ is greater than
√
0.5, and tends to 1 when it is lower; if P ∧Q is not
true, then it always tends to 0. Interestingly, he also computes the expectation of appearance
of the paradox when the vector of probabilities is assumed to follow a non-informative uniform
prior on the simplex.
4 True and false rates and ROC analysis
Receiver operating characteristics (ROC) plots were introduced to visualize and compare binary
classifiers in signal detection (see, e.g. Egan [10]) and its use extends to medical tests, machine
learning and other disciplines where binary decisions have to be taken under uncertainty (see
Fawcett [11] for an introductory presentation of ROC plots). The term classifier is also used as
a synonym of decision rule.
In signal detection theory, propositions are related to the emission/reception of a binary digit.
Denote by 0ˆ and 1ˆ the bit received and by 0 and 1 the bit actually sent. The true positive rate
(TPR) is defined as the probability of receiving 1ˆ when 1 is the true bit emitted, and the true
negative rate (TNR) as the probability of receiving 0ˆ when 0 is the bit sent. Analogously, the
false positive rate (FPR) and the false negative rate (FNR) are, respectively, the probabilities
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of receiving 1ˆ when 0 is the true digit, and of receiving 0ˆ when 1 is the true digit. From these
definitions, it is clear that a decision rule such that TPR ≈ 1 and and FPR ≈ 0 has a “good
performance”.
Remark 4.1. In classical statistics, decision rules appear in the context of hypothesis testing,
where the TPR is the power of the test, the greater the better, under the restriction that the FPR
(called the type-I error) does not exceed a fixed small value (the significance level). The type-II
error corresponds to the FNR. The two types of errors are thus treated in a non-symmetric way.
In medicine, the TPR and the TNR are respectively called sensitivity and specificity.
In the ROC graph, several classifiers can be compared on the basis of the pair (FPR,TPR)
represented in the unit square [0, 1] × [0, 1], the so-called ROC space (see Figure 2). Usually,
the rates are estimated from sample data. “Good” decision rules are expected to correspond
to points close to the upper left corner (0, 1) of the unit square. Different measures of the
proximity to that corner can be considered. The most widely used is the area of the shaded
triangle (AOT) in Figure 2, defined by the points (0, 0), (1, 1) and (FPR,TPR). The closer the
area to 0.5, the better the classifier is considered. Points on the diagonal of the square correspond
to completely random classifiers, for which the probability of true and false positives are equal.
Points below the diagonal line represent classifiers that perform worse than random. Following
[11], the classifiers plotted near the (0, 0) corner can be said to be “conservative”, because they
make few positive classifications (true or false). For the same reason, classifiers plotted near to
the (1, 1) corner are sometimes called “liberal” because they tend to have a higher number of
false positives.
It is immediate from Figure 2 that the area of the triangle can be expressed in terms of the rates
as follows:
AOT = 12(TPR− FPR) (8)
= 12 −
(FPR
2 +
FNR
2
)
. (9)
In the definition of AOT, the roles of the rates FPR and FNR are symmetric. In some situations,
it may be desirable to assign different weights to these errors. This leads to the concept of
weighted area of the triangle, WAOT. Indeed, fixing a weight value w ∈ (0, 1), one can define,
by analogy with formula (9),
WAOTw := 12 −
(
w · FPR + (1− w) · FNR) . (10)
For any w ∈ (0, 1), WAOTw takes values in [−12 , 12 ], negative “areas” corresponding to points
below the diagonal. If w > 12 , the weighted area WAOTw penalizes false positives more than
false negatives; and if w < 12 , it is the other way round. The points of the ROC space yielding
the same value of WAOT are straight lines, with slope equal to w/(1− w), see Figure 3.
Unequal weights are useful in some practical situations: For instance, in court of justice cases,
it is common that false positives (declaring guilty an innocent defendant) are considered worst
than false negatives; in medical tests, the two errors often play an obvious asymmetric role too.
In some applications, the rates TPR, FPR of a given classifier can be estimated on the basis of
a “test sample” in which the actual states of the nature are known (0 or 1 in each observation)
and the outputs of the classifier (0ˆ or 1ˆ) are compared against the actual states. The results are
often summarized in a contingency table known as confusion matrix. In social applications, as
9
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Figure 2: The black dot represents a classifier in the ROC space, represented by its coordi-
nates (FPR,TPR), and the shaded area is AOT.
is the case of court cases, the actual states are supposed to be unknown and there might not be
test samples available. However, the rates FPR and TPR can be defined and computed exactly
under our model assumptions as we will see in rest of this section. First, we translate the ROC
analysis vocabulary to our probabilistic framework.
Definition 4.2. Assume the model conditions (C1)–(C4) of Section 3. The true positive rate
associated to a decision rule R is defined as the probability to “decide P ∧Q” under the state of
the nature “P ∧Q true”, and it depends on n, θ and the decision rule:
TPR(n, θ,R) := PP∧Q{R(X,Y, Z, T ) = 1}, (11)
where PP∧Q denotes the multinomial law of Proposition 3.1, with parameters corresponding to
the state of nature “P ∧Q true”.
Proposition 4.3. Under the assumptions (C1)–(C4), the true positive rates defined in (11) for
rules R1, R2, R3 are:
TPR(n, θ,R1) =
n∑
i=0
n−i∑
j=0
n−i−j∑
k=m−i∧j+1
(
n
i, j, k, `
)
θi+j+2k(1− θ)2n−i−j−2k , (12)
TPR(n, θ,R2) =
n∑
i=0
n−i∑
j=0
n−i−j∑
k=m−b i∧j2 c+1
(
n
i, j, k, `
)
θi+j+2k(1− θ)2n−i−j−2k , (13)
TPR(n, θ,R3) =
n∑
i=0
n−i∑
j=0
n−i−j∑
k=m+1
(
n
i, j, k, `
)
θi+j+2k(1− θ)2n−i−j−2k , (14)
where ` = n− i− j − k.
See the Appendix for the proof. Notice that the inequalities R3 ≤ R2 ≤ R1 induce the corre-
sponding inequalities among the true positive rates:
TPR(n, θ,R3) ≤ TPR(n, θ,R2) ≤ TPR(n, θ,R1) .
10
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FPR
T
PR
(0, 0)
(1, 1)
(1, 0)
(0, 1) 23 12 13
Figure 3: Level lines for the value WAOTw = 0.25 with weights w = 23 ,
1
2 ,
1
3 .
False positives can arise under the three different states of nature contained in the negation
¬(P ∧Q). To define the false positive rate FPR, we adopt the conservative approach, taking the
maximum of the probabilities of accepting P ∧Q under each of the states. We see in the next
proposition that the largest probability always corresponds to the case when one of the clauses
P or Q is true and the other one is false.
Proposition 4.4. Let R be any one of the rules R1, R2 or R3. Under assumptions (C1)–(C4)
of Section 3, we have
PP∧¬Q{R(X,Y, Z, T ) = 1} = P¬P∧Q{R(X,Y, Z, T ) = 1} > P¬P∧¬Q{R(X,Y, Z, T ) = 1} . (15)
The equality in (15) follows from condition (C2), which assumes equal competence on judging
P and Q. The inequality on the right is intuitive noticing that the state ¬P ∧ ¬Q is “the less
likely one” to decide P ∧Q. A formal proof is given in the Appendix.
Definition 4.5. Let R be any one of the rules R1, R2 or R3. We define the false positive rate
as:
FPR(n, θ,R) :=PP∧¬Q{R(X,Y, Z, T ) = 1} . (16)
Definition 4.6. Let R be any one of the rules R1, R2 or R3. We define the area of the triangle
as:
AOT(n, θ,R) := 12
(
TPR(n, θ,R)− FPR(n, θ,R)) . (17)
Fix w ∈ (0, 1). We define the weighted area of the triangle as:
WAOTw(n, θ,R) := 12 −
(
wFPR(n, θ,R) + (1− w)FNR(n, θ,R)) .
Using the formulae of Proposition 3.1, one can write the analogue of Proposition 4.3 for FPR.
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Proposition 4.7. Under the assumptions (C1)–(C4), the false positive rate defined in (16) for
each fixed rule is:
FPR(n, θ,R1) =
n∑
i=0
n−i∑
j=0
n−i−j∑
k=m−i∧j+1
(
n
i, j, k, `
)
θn−i+j(1− θ)n+i−j , (18)
FPR(n, θ,R2) =
n∑
i=0
n−i∑
j=0
n−i−j∑
k=m−b i∧j2 c+1
(
n
i, j, k, `
)
θn−i+j(1− θ)n+i−j , (19)
FPR(n, θ,R3) =
n∑
i=0
n−i∑
j=0
n−i−j∑
k=m+1
(
n
i, j, k, `
)
θn−i+j(1− θ)n+i−j , (20)
where ` = n− i− j − k.
The computations are completely analogous to those of Proposition 4.3, and we have the ordering
FPR(n, θ,R3) ≤ FPR(n, θ,R2) ≤ FPR(n, θ,R1) ,
as with the positive rates.
5 Main results
In this section we will use the concepts from ROC analysis introduced in Section 4 as a numeric
criterion to compare the relative goodness of decision rules. Theorem 5.2 establishes the pref-
erence order of the three rules considered, under the criterion of greater area of the triangle,
where it is seen that R1 is uniformly the best. This is still true when the false negatives are
more penalised than the false positives (Corollary 5.3). If false positives are deemed worse, the
situation is more complex and interesting; it will be covered by Theorem 5.4.
Definition 5.1. A rule R is AOT-better than a rule R′ if and only if, for all n odd and θ > 12 ,
AOT(n, θ,R) ≥ AOT(n, θ,R′) , (21)
and the inequality is strict for some value of n or θ.
Under our model assumptions, it is now shown that rule R1 is AOT-better than R2 and that
R2 is AOT-better than R3:
Theorem 5.2. Under the model conditions (C1)–(C4), for all n ≥ 3 odd and for all θ > 12 ,
AOT(n, θ,R3) ≤ AOT(n, θ,R2) < AOT(n, θ,R1)
and the first inequality is strict for n ≥ 7.
Proof. We start with the second inequality, which is equivalent, by (8), to TPR(n, θ,R2) −
FPR(n, θ,R2) < TPR(n, θ,R1)− FPR(n, θ,R1), and therefore to
FPR(n, θ,R1)− FPR(n, θ,R2) < TPR(n, θ,R1)− TPR(n, θ,R2) . (22)
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In other words, it is equivalent to say that the increase in true positives when changing from R2
to R1 more than compensates the increase in false positives.
Using formulas (12), (13), (18) and (19), it is clearly enough to prove that, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, for
all 0 ≤ j ≤ n− i, and for all m− i ∧ j + 1 ≤ k ≤ m− b i∧j2 c,
θn−i+j(1− θ)n+i−j < θi+j+2k(1− θ)2n−i−j−2k
or, equivalently, that
(1− θ)2i+2k−n < θ2i+2k−n ,
which can be easily checked taking into account that 0 < 1− θ < θ and 2i+ 2k−n > 0: Indeed,
n = 2m+ 1 and k ≥ m− i ∧ j + 1 imply that 2i+ 2k − n ≥ 2i+ 2(m− i ∧ j + 1)− (2m+ 1) =
2i− 2i ∧ j + 1 ≥ 1. Thus, the second inequality is proved.
A similar argument proves the first one, using (13), (14), (19) and (20), and noticing that
k ≥ m− i ∧ j + 1 also holds. the inequality is strict, unless n ≤ 5, in which case R2 and R3 are
equal (see Proposition 2.5).
For the weighted area of the triangle defined by formula (10), and weights w < 12 (that means,
when false negatives are considered more harmful than false positives), the relations between
R1, R2 and R3 are the same as with AOT (case w = 12), as stated in the next Corollary 5.3.
However, for w > 12 , none of the rules gives a greater WAOT than another, uniformly in n ≥ 3
and 12 < θ < 1; this will be precisely stated and proved in Theorem 5.4.
Corollary 5.3. Under the model conditions (C1)–(C4), for all n ≥ 3 odd, and for all θ > 12
and w < 12 ,
WAOTw(n, θ,R3) ≤WAOTw(n, θ,R2) <WAOTw(n, θ,R1) ,
and the first inequality is strict for n ≥ 7.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 5.2 is based in checking the inequality (22). The analogue for the
weighted area is w
(
FPR(n, θ,R1) − FPR(n, θ,R2)
)
< (1 − w)(TPR(n, θ,R1) − TPR(n, θ,R2)),
which trivially follows from (22) when w < 12 .
The case w > 12 is different. The relation between the WAOT of R1 and R2 is the same if the
competence θ stands above a certain threshold C(w), with 12 < C(w) < w, and similarly with
R2 and R3. This is made precise in the next theorem.
Theorem 5.4. Fix n ≥ 3. For every weight 12 < w < 1, there exists C1(w), smaller than w
(except that C1(w) = w if n = 3), such that
θ > C1(w)⇒WAOTw(n, θ,R1) >WAOTw(n, θ,R2) .
Fix n ≥ 7. For every weight 12 < w < 1, there exists C2(w), smaller than w, such that
θ > C2(w)⇒WAOTw(n, θ,R2) >WAOTw(n, θ,R3) .
The theorem will follow from the following two lemmas. In the proofs, we only treat in detail the
claims relating R1 and R2, those relating R2 and R3 being analogous, with only slight changes
that will be noted. The condition n ≥ 7 in the second case is needed since otherwise R2 and R3
coincide, as we have seen in Section 2.
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The first lemma is interesting in itself in that it establishes a dichotomy when we look at θ
as fixed and let w vary. The second lemma states some technical properties of the functions
introduced in the first. Refer to Figure 4 for a graphical clue of the situation presented in
theorem and lemmas.
Lemma 5.5. Fix n ≥ 3. For every competence 12 < θ < 1, there exists a constant D1(θ), greater
than θ (except that D1(θ) = θ if n = 3), such that
w < D1(θ)⇒WAOTw(n, θ,R1) >WAOTw(n, θ,R2)
w > D1(θ)⇒WAOTw(n, θ,R1) <WAOTw(n, θ,R2) .
Fix n ≥ 7. For every competence 12 < θ < 1, there exists a constant D2(θ), greater than θ, such
that
w < D2(θ)⇒WAOTw(n, θ,R2) >WAOTw(n, θ,R3)
w > D2(θ)⇒WAOTw(n, θ,R2) <WAOTw(n, θ,R3) .
Lemma 5.6. For i = 1, 2, the functions θ 7→ Di(θ) in Proposition 5.5 satisfy:
1. For any 12 < θ < 1, we have also
1
2 < Di(θ) < 1.
2. Di is continuous in the interval (12 , 1).
3. limθ↘ 12 Di(θ) =
1
2 and limθ↗1Di(θ) = 1.
θ
w
D
C(w)
0.5
0.5
1
1
Figure 4: An example graph (in red) of a function D(θ) with the properties of Lemmas 5.5
and 5.6. For competence values θ greater than C(w), rule R1 is better than rule R2 in the
sense of the weighted area of the triangle.
Proof of Lemma 5.5.
We prove the first part of the lemma, the other one being analogous, and write simply D instead
of D1.
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Fix n ≥ 3, and let 12 < θ < 1. From the definitions of WAOT, FPR, FNR and TPR, the
inequality WAOTw(n, θ,R2) <WAOTw(n, θ,R1) is equivalent to
w
(
FPR(n, θ,R1)− FPR(n, θ,R2)
)
< (1− w)(TPR(n, θ,R1)− TPR(n, θ,R2)) ,
or
(1− w)(TPR(n, θ,R1)− TPR(n, θ,R2))− w(FPR(n, θ,R1)− FPR(n, θ,R2)) > 0 . (23)
We know that inequality (23) is true for w ≤ 12 , for all n ≥ 3 and all θ > 12 , by Theorem 5.2 and
Corollary 5.3, whereas for w = 1 is manifestly false, since clearly FPR(n, θ,R1)−FPR(n, θ,R2) >
0, from (18)-(19).
Since the left-hand side is a linear function of w, there must be a unique point D(θ) such that
the equality holds in (23), and such that for every w < D(θ) rule R1 yields a greater weighted
area than R2, whereas for every w > D(θ) it is the other way round.
Let us now prove than D(θ) > θ: Consider the particular weight w = θ. We only need to check
that (23) is satisfied for this w. Indeed, using (12–13) and (18–19), inequality (23) is equivalent,
for this particular value, to
n∑
i=0
n−i∑
j=0
(m−b i∧j2 c)∧(n−i−j)∑
k=m−i∧j+1
(
n
i, j, k, `
)[
θi+j+2k(1− θ)1+2n−i−j−2k − θ1+n−i+j(1− θ)n+i−j
]
> 0 .
(24)
The expression in square brackets is non-negative if and only if( θ
1− θ
)2(i+k)−(n+1) ≥ 1 .
Taking into account that we are assuming θ > 12 , and that 2(i + k) ≥ n + 1 in this range of
indices, the sum (24) is non-negative. One can easily check that there is at least one positive
term in the sum for n > 3. By the linearity in w, and the fact that w = θ satisfies (23), it is
clear that the critical point D(θ) is greater than θ. In the special case n = 3, there is only one
term in the sum and it is equal to zero, hence D(θ) = θ.
The claim on R2 and R3 can be proved in the same way, with the only difference that the index
k in the sum (24) ranges from m− b i∧j2 c+ 1 to m ∧ (n− i− j). If n = 7, the only term in the
sum (24) is already positive, and there is no need to consider this limit case separately.
Proof of Lemma 5.6.
Again, we prove the claim for D1 and call it simply D. The proofs for D2 are similar, with the
differences pointed out at the end.
Fix n ≥ 3. The point D(θ) is easily computed: D(θ) = A(θ)/(A(θ) +B(θ)), with
A(θ) := TPR(n, θ,R1)− TPR(n, θ,R2) , B(θ) := FPR(n, θ,R1)− FPR(n, θ,R2) .
Using (12–13) and (18–19), their explicit expressions are:
A(θ) =
n∑
i=0
n−i∑
j=0
(m−b i∧j2 c)∧(n−i−j)∑
k=m−i∧j+1
(
n
i, j, k, `
)
θi+j+2k(1− θ)2n−i−j−2k
B(θ) =
n∑
i=0
n−i∑
j=0
(m−b i∧j2 c)∧(n−i−j)∑
k=m−i∧j+1
(
n
i, j, k, `
)
θn−i+j(1− θ)n+i−j .
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First, notice that the function D(θ) is the quotient of two polynomials in θ that never vanish
because both the true and the false positive rates are greater for rule R1 than for R2, for all θ > 12
and n ≥ 3 (see again (12)-(13) and (18)-(19)). Hence, it is clear thatD is continuous and less than
1 in its domain. Moreover, Lemma 5.5 ensures that 12 < θ ≤ D(θ). In particular, 12 < D(θ) < 1.
For θ = 12 , both A and B are well defined and A(
1
2) = B(
1
2), giving limθ↘ 12 D(θ) =
1
2 .
To complete the proof of the lemma, we must see that limθ↗1Di(θ) = 1. This is equivalent to
see that limθ↗1 ψ(θ) = 0, where ψ(θ) := B(θ)A(θ) .
For simplicity, let us denote by Ω the valid range of the indices in the triple sums above,
Ω := {ω = (i, j, k, `) : 0 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ j ≤ n− i,
m− i ∧ j + 1 ≤ k ≤ (m− b i∧j2 c) ∧ (n− i− j), ` = n− i− j − k} ,
and also
α :=
(
n
i, j, k, `
)
and γ := θ1− θ .
Then we can write
A(γ) =
( 1
1 + γ
)2n ∑
ω∈Ω
αγi+j+2k , B(γ) =
( 1
1 + γ
)2n ∑
ω∈Ω
αγn−i+j
and
ψ(γ) =
∑
ω∈Ω
αγn−i+j∑
ω∈Ω
αγi+j+2k
. (25)
The parameter γ is an increasing function of θ, mapping (12 , 1) into (1,∞). Therefore, it is
enough to show that ψ(γ) converges to 0 as γ ↗∞. To see this, consider the highest powers of
the polynomials in (25). Let us check that
max
ω∈Ω
(n− i+ j) = n+m− 1 and max
ω∈Ω
(i+ j + 2k) = n+m ; (26)
then clearly lim
γ↗∞
ψ(γ) = 0 and the proof will be complete.
Indeed, notice that ω∗ = (1,m,m, 0) belongs to Ω and achieves both values n−m−1 and n+m.
Moreover, for any ω = (i, j, k, `) ∈ Ω, we have i+ j+ 2k ≤ n+ k ≤ n+m. For the other bound,
consider two cases: If j ≤ i, the inequality n− i+ j ≤ n+m− 1 is trivial; for j > i, we have on
Ω the condition m− i+ 1 ≤ n− i− j, equivalent to m ≥ j. Since we have also i ≥ 1 on Ω, we
deduce m ≥ −i+ j + 1. Adding n− 1 to both sides, we get again the desired inequality. Thus,
(26) is checked and this finishes the proof for D1.
The claims for D2 can be proved in the same way with the difference that, in the correspondingly
defined set Ω, index k ranges from m−b i∧j2 c+1 to m∧ (n− i− j), and that the maximum value
of (n− i− j) on Ω is n+m− 3; the maximum of (i+ j + 2k) is again n+m, and both maxima
are achieved at the point w = (2,m − 1,m, 0) ∈ Ω. The remaining arguments of the proof are
identical.
Proof of Theorem 5.4.
Denote, as before, by D and C de functions D1 and C1, respectively. The proof of the second
part of the theorem is identical, with D2 and C2.
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From Lemma 5.5 and Lemma 5.6, we know that D(θ) defines a continuous function that maps
[12 , 1] onto [
1
2 , 1] (extending it by continuity at the endpoints), and that the curve
(
θ,D(θ)
)
lies
above the diagonal, as depicted in Figure 4. The shaded region below the curve is the set of pairs
(θ, w) for which WAOTw(n, θ,R1) >WAOTw(n, θ,R2), and the inequality is reversed above the
curve.
Regardless whether D is and increasing function or not, and since it is a quotient of polynomials,
for any fixed w in (12 , 1) there is a largest value C(w) ∈ (12 , 1) that solves for θ the equation
D(θ) = w. And it is clear from the figure that for all θ > C(w), all points of the segment
{(θ, w) : θ > C(w)} lie below the curve, hence WAOTw(n, θ,R1) >WAOTw(n, θ,R2) for these
values.
Finally, since D(θ) > θ for all θ if n > 3, we have in particular w = D(C(w)) > C(w). For
n = 3, D(θ) = θ, and we get w = C(w). This finishes the proof.
6 Examples
In this section we illustrate the above theory with some numeric computations and figures.
It is clear from the previous sections that none of the rules considered is best for all pairs (θ, w)
of competence and weight. In fact, no two rules Ri and Rj are comparable, uniformly in θ and w
(except for R2 and R3 when n ≤ 5, because they coincide). Indeed, Table 4 shows the different
possible orders under the WAOT criterion for three fixed competence values and for varying
w ∈ (0, 1), and committee size n = 11.
θ = 0.6 θ = 0.75 θ = 0.90
R3 < R2 < R1 0 < w < 0.6930 0 < w < 0.8722 0 < w < 0.9576
R3 < R1 < R2 0.6930 < w < 0.7184 0.8722 < w < 0.9154 0.9576 < w < 0.9847
R1 < R3 < R2 0.7184 < w < 0.8215 0.9154 < w < 0.9820 0.9847 < w < 0.9995
R1 < R2 < R3 0.8215 < w < 1 0.9820 < w < 1 0.9995 < w < 1
Table 4: For each θ, intervals of weights w where each order of rules holds true. Te committee
size is n = 11. The symbol < in the first column means here the relation “worse than” with
respect to the WAOT criterion.
In Table 5, again with committee size n = 11, the values of TPR, FPR, and AOT are computed
to four decimal places for a large range of competence values, using (12–14) and (18–20). The
last column is the value of WAOT for a fixed weight w = 0.75; in other words, false positives
penalises the performance measure three times more than false negatives. In column five, they
penalise in the same proportion.
Under the AOT criterion, R1 (IbyI) is always better than R2 (PbyP), and R2 is better than
R3 (CbyC), as Theorem 5.2 claims. The numbers in the table give an idea of the extent of the
difference, suggesting that R2 and R3 are closer together than R1 and R2. We also see that for
very high values of θ the rules get closer and approach fast to the perfect value 0.5.
For the WAOT criterion, with w = 0.75, we see that for low competence values of the jury, it is
better to use rules R2 or R3. At some point, the order of AOT is re-established and preserved
till the end of the table. From Table 4 we could deduce that this happens somewhere between
0.60 and 0.75, and here we see that it must be for some value between 0.60 and 0.65. Of course
the exact value can be computed, and it turns out to be 0.6374.
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n θ rule TPR FPR AOT WAOT
11 0.55 1 0.4008 0.2323 0.0843 0.1760
11 0.55 2 0.1372 0.0589 0.0391 0.2401
11 0.55 3 0.0811 0.0327 0.0242 0.2457
11 0.60 1 0.5678 0.1857 0.1910 0.2526
11 0.60 2 0.2569 0.0480 0.1044 0.2782
11 0.60 3 0.1661 0.0283 0.0689 0.2703
11 0.65 1 0.7247 0.1266 0.2991 0.3363
11 0.65 2 0.4197 0.0340 0.1928 0.3294
11 0.65 3 0.2984 0.0219 0.1382 0.3081
11 0.70 1 0.8497 0.0721 0.3888 0.4083
11 0.70 2 0.6050 0.0207 0.2922 0.3857
11 0.70 3 0.4729 0.0148 0.2291 0.3571
11 0.75 1 0.9325 0.0331 0.4497 0.4583
11 0.75 2 0.7779 0.0105 0.3837 0.4366
11 0.75 3 0.6649 0.0084 0.3282 0.4099
11 0.80 1 0.9768 0.0115 0.4827 0.4856
11 0.80 2 0.9051 0.0042 0.4505 0.4731
11 0.80 3 0.8339 0.0037 0.4151 0.4557
11 0.85 1 0.9947 0.0026 0.4960 0.4967
11 0.85 2 0.9735 0.0012 0.4862 0.4925
11 0.85 3 0.9446 0.0011 0.4717 0.4853
11 0.90 1 0.9994 0.0003 0.4996 0.4996
11 0.90 2 0.9965 0.0002 0.4982 0.4990
11 0.90 3 0.9910 0.0002 0.4954 0.4976
11 0.95 1 1.0000 0.0000 0.5000 0.5000
11 0.95 2 0.9999 0.0000 0.5000 0.5000
11 0.95 3 0.9997 0.0000 0.4999 0.4999
Table 5: Comparison of decision rules R1, R2 and R3 in the ROC map for a fixed number
of voters n = 11 and different competence levels θ. Notice that R1 has the largest values of
AOT for any fixed θ, that is, the sequence of ordered rules from best to worst is always 1,
2, 3. are recorded in the last column.
A simple illustration of the evolution of the AOT for the three rules we are considering, for
several committee sizes, can be seen in Figure 5a. For n = 3, 7, 11 the AOT value is drawn
against θ, with red (R1), blue (R2) and green (R3) curves. Notice that the largest absolute
differences in AOT take place around the middle values of the competence range. That means,
for 0.6 . θ . 0.8, say, it is when the election of the decision rule is most critical.
The analogous Figure 5b shows the same curves, in the case w = 0.75. Rule R1 is the worst in
the lower end of θ values, and the best in the upper end. Rule R3 does the opposite.
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(a) AOT. Rule R1 is uniformly best in θ.
θ
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WAOT, w = 0.75, n = 7
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WAOT, w = 0.75, n = 11
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(b) WAOT. For any w > 1/2, there is no a
uniformly best or worst rule.
Figure 5: AOT and WAOT for each of the rules R1 (red), R2 (blue), R3 (green) as a function
of θ, for several committee sizes n
Combining the committee sizes n = 3, 7, 11 and the competence values θ = 0.60, 0.75, 0.90, we
draw the triangles in ROC space of the three decision rules, in Figure 6. In this picture, it can
be observed that the area of the triangle determined by rule R1 (in red) is larger than the area
determined by R2 (in blue), which in its turn is larger than the area determined by rule R3 (in
green) for n > 5, and that the triangles of R2 and R3 coincide for n = 3 and n = 5.
The ROC analysis helps in comparing several decision rules, but it is also useful to visualize the
performance of a given rule depending on the parameters. For example, taking three values for
the competence, θ = 0.60, 0.75, 0.90, and three values for the committee size n = 3, 7, 11, the
ROC representation in Figure 7 displays a curve going form near the diagonal when θ = 0.60 to
near the corner (0,1), when θ = 0.90. From the figure it is apparent that the quality of the voters
in terms of the competence is definitely much more important than its quantity. (Karotkin and
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Figure 6: ROC representation of R1, R2 and R3, for several committee sizes n and different
competences θ. Values in the legend are the AOT.
Paroush [13] arrive to the same conclusion in the single-premise case.)
It is also natural to ask, for a given rule and competence value θ, what is the minimum number
of voters n that ensures that the TPR, TNR and AOT (w = 0.5) reach a certain given threshold
k? This minimum is easy to find out. For example, Table 6 give the numbers, for decision rule
R1 (IbyI), a range of θ values and quite demanding thresholds. Notice that to ensure a certain
threshold of TPR the size of the committee must be greater than to ensure the same threshold
for TNR. This is because for a fixed size n, rule R1 the probability to produce a true negative
is greater than the probability to produce a true positive
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Figure 7: ROC representation of R1 for different numbers of voters n = 3, 7, 11 (the number
is used as the location in ROC space) and different competences θ = 0.60, 0.75, 0.90 in
different shades of grey. Notice than the range in the horizontal axis has been rescaled.
7 Discussion
In this paper, we have defined a theoretical framework, based on a probabilistic model, that
describes the behaviour of a committee faced to decide the truth or falsity of a compound ques-
tion. The application of the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC), a concept originating in
signal processing, and adopted in several other fields, seems to be new in judgement aggregation
research. It allows an objective assessment of the quality of a group decision on a complex issue,
based on the (possibly subjective) competence of the members of the group. It also allows to
compare different decision rules, both for symmetric or asymmetric penalising weights on the
false positives and false negatives.
The simplicity of the model has allowed us to focus on the methodology of ROC space, but
the assumptions can be easily weakened in several ways and the computations can be adapted
without much difficulty. For example:
21
A. Alabert — M. Farré Doctrinal paradox
θ
0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
For TPR, k=0.95 95 41 23 13 9 7 5 3
For TNR, k=0.95 65 29 15 9 7 5 3 3
For AOT, k=0.45 81 35 19 13 7 5 3 3
Table 6: For each indicator, TPR, TNR and AOT, minimum committee size needed to
reach the threshold k, for rule R1 and different competence values θ.
• Different voters’ competence θ. If competences are different, the law of (X,Y, Z, T ) de-
scribed in Proposition 3.1 is no more multinomial. The vote of each committee member
k = 1, . . . , n is a random object Jk equal to one of the four possible vote schemes with
certain probabilities (pkx, pky , pkz , pkt ), independently. If θk is the competence of member k,
then, under the true state P ∧Q, this vector of probabilities is
(θ2k, θk(1− θk), θk(1− θk), 1− θ2k) .
The law of (X,Y, Z, T ) will be the law of J1 + · · · + Jn, which can be computed for any
given set of parameters θk. The same can be done for the states of nature P ∧¬Q, ¬P ∧Q,
and ¬(P ∧Q).
The true and false positive rates under the vector of competences θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) and rule
R will be given, following Definitions 4.2 and 4.5, by
TPR(n, θ,R) =
∑
R(i,j,k,`)=1
PP∧Q
{
J1 + · · ·+ Jn = (i, j, k, `)} ,
and
FPR(n, θ,R) =
∑
R(i,j,k,`)=1
PP∧¬Q
{
J1 + · · ·+ Jn = (i, j, k, `)} .
A study of dichotomous decision making under different individual competences, within a
probabilistic framework, can be found in Sapir [20].
• Non-independence between voters. If the committee members do not vote independently,
then, in order to make exact computations, one must have the joint probability law of
the vector (J1, . . . , Jn), which take values in the n-fold Cartesian product of {P ∧Q,P ∧
¬Q,¬P ∧Q,¬(P ∧Q)}. From the joint law, the distribution of the sum J1 + · · ·+ Jn can
always be made explicit, for each state of nature and taking into account the given vector
of competences (θ1, . . . , θn). And from there, the values of FPR, FNR and AOT can be
also obtained for any rule.
Boland [1] studies this situation of non-independence and diverse competence values for
the voting of a single question, and assuming the existence of a “leader” in the committee.
He generalises Condorcet theorem when the correlation coefficient between voters does not
exceeds a certain threshold. That situation is completely different from ours.
• Non-independence between the premises. The premises may depend on each other in the
sense that believing that P is true or false changes the perception on the veracity or falsity
of Q. An extreme example of dependence is the classical P =“existence of a contract” and
Q =“defendant breached the contract”, where voting ¬P forces to vote ¬Q.
In these situations, some more data is needed, namely, the competence of each voter on
one of the premises alone, and on the other premise conditioned to have guessed correctly
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the first, and conditioned to have guessed it incorrectly. To wit, suppose that θP is
the competence of a voter on premise P , that θQ|P is her competence on Q if she guesses
correctly on P , and that θQ|P¯ is her competence on Q assuming she does not guess correctly
on P . Then, the first row in the table of Proposition 3.1 would read
px py pz pt
P ∧Q θP θQ|P θP (1− θQ|P ) (1− θP )θQ|P¯ (1− θP )(1− θQ|P¯ )
and similarly for the other true states of nature.
• Competence depending on the true state. The probability to guess the truth may depend
on the truth itself, i.e θ = (θP , θ¬P , θQ, θ¬Q) could be four different parameters associated
to the committee members, giving the probabilities of guessing the true state of nature
when P is true, P is false, Q is true and Q is false, respectively. And these probabilities
can be different for each individual, of course.
All these extensions can be combined together. The key to compute FPR, FNR, and conse-
quently the values of AOT and WAOTw of any given rule is the ability to compute the proba-
bility of appearance of all possible contingency tables (Table 3); and this is possible for all the
extensions of the list above. It is not easy to establish general theorems of comparison between
rules, but a computer software can evaluate and compare rules for any specific value of all the
parameters involved. Notice that it is not even necessary to fix n and θ. Two differently formed
committees, adhering to the same or to different decision rules, can be compared applying the
same ideas, using the symmetric or the weighted area of the triangle. In this paper, we have
stuck to the simplest of the situations in our exposition, to better highlight the methodology,
and to obtain some specific theoretical results.
In ROC analysis one usually relies in sample training data for the classifier. Here we have
postulated the existence of an exact competence parameter θ. This parameter can be assigned
on subjective grounds, but of course past data, if available, can be used to estimate its value.
Furthermore, if after a new experiment it is possible to assess the quality of a voter’s decision,
this value could be readjusted in a Bayesian manner. As examples of possible practical relevance,
we mention: In court cases, the level of a court, and the proportion of cases that have been
successfully appealed to higher instances, can measure the competence of individual judges; in
some professional sport competitions, referees are ranked according to their performance in past
events, and it is usually easy to determine a posteriori the proportion of their correct decisions
in a given event; in simultaneous medical tests, the “competence” or reliability of each one is
usually known to some extent, and they can be combined to offer the best diagnostic decision,
taking possibly into account the risks of false positives or false negatives through the weight
parameter w.
It may be argued that the explicit appearance of the doctrinal paradox is rare in practice,
but this depends on the competence parameter θ, the committee size n, and the two specific
rules that we are comparing. In fact, the probability that the individual decisions lead to the
paradoxical situation between two given rules can be computed explicitly. For instance, List [16,
Propostion 2], computes the probability of the occurrence of the paradox from our formula (7),
and the two classical rules issue-by-issue (IbyI, R1) and case-by-case (CbyC, R2).
However, the potential appearance of the paradox cannot be avoided, except for the trivial one-
member committee. The interest must then be focused in the choice of the “best decision rule”
among a catalogue of rules. The question then becomes to define a criterion to evaluate decision
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rules. In this work, we have considered a family of criteria, which are completely objective, once
fixed the subjective weight of the two competing risks, the false positive and the false negative, in
deciding if the conjunction P ∧Q is true. This is contrast with the classical theory of Hypothesis
Testing, but in line with Statistical Decision Theory.
The subjective evaluation of the risks is clearly an a priori matter, to be fixed before the casting
of the votes, and therefore any instance of the situation we are analysing has a definite logical way
to arrive to the correct decision. In this sense, we dare claim to have a complete solution to the
doctrinal paradox. To be thoroughly honest, though, we must mention that the definition of the
false positive rate (Definition 4.5), justified by Proposition 4.4, has some degree of arbitrariness.
Let us finish by commenting on possible extensions and open questions:
Instead of using the majority principle, another “qualified majority” can be employed, and the
analysis of the modified rules can be done similarly. Still another possibility is to use score
versions of the rules: Instead of 0/1 outputs, one can use more general mappings from the set
of tables into the set of real numbers. These mappings are called scores. The natural scores to
associate to rules R1, R2, R3 are, respectively
S1 = x+ y ∧ z −m , S2 = x+ by ∧ z2 c −m , S3 = x−m ,
and clearly S3 ≤ S2 ≤ S1. ROC analysis can be done the same with scores, where the goal is to
find the best score to fix as a boundary in deciding between P ∧Q and ¬(P ∧Q) from the point
of view of the area under the curve. Admissible scores can be defined similarly to admissible
rules: they must be non-decreasing functions with respect to the partial order on T defined in
Section 2. See [11] for a good short introduction to score rules and ROC curves.
We have compared three particular rules, two of them traditional, and a reasonable third one
that lies in between. They are easily expressed in terms of the entries of the contingency table
of votes. But there are much more admissible rules; a total of 36 in the case n = 3, and they
are not easy to enumerate systematically in general. Hence, the question of enumerating all
admissible rules and choosing the best according to some criterion is open.
Finally, notice that in Theorem 5.4 we have not assumed that the function θ → D(θ) is increas-
ing. We conjecture that it always is, but we do not have yet a formal proof. If this conjecture
is true, or in a particular case in which it is checked to be true, then one could strengthen the
theorem by claiming that for every weight 12 < w < 1, there exists a value C(w), smaller than
w, such that
θ > C(w)⇒WAOTw(n, θ,R1) >WAOTw(n, θ,R2)
θ < C(w)⇒WAOTw(n, θ,R1) <WAOTw(n, θ,R2)
(see Figure 8, and compare with Figure 4), and similarly for R2 in relation with R3.
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Figure 8: If D is a non-decreasing function, then C(w) splits the θ-axis in two segments.
For θ on the right, rule R1 is better than R2 in the sense of the weighted area under the
triangle with weight w; for θ on the left, R2 is better than R1. Compare with the general
D of Figure 4.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.2 For rule R1, we must show the equivalence
(x+ y > z + t, x+ z > y + t) ⇐⇒ x > m− y ∧ z .
Indeed,
x+ y > z + t ⇐⇒ x+ y > n− x− y ⇐⇒ 2x+ 2y > n = 2m+ 1
⇐⇒ x+ y > m+ 12 ⇐⇒ x > m− y ,
taking into account that we are dealing with integer numbers. The equivalence x+z > y+t⇐⇒
x > m− z is proved in an identical way and (4) follows.
For rule R2, we must prove the equivalence in (5), that is,
(x > z + t, x > y + t) ⇐⇒ x > m− by∧z2 c .
We have
x > z + t ⇐⇒ x > n− x− y ⇐⇒ 2x > 2m+ 1− y ⇐⇒ x > m− y−12 .
If y is odd, say y = 2q + 1, then both y−12 and by2c are equal to q, and we get the equivalence
with x > m− by2c. If y = 2q,
x > m− y−12 = m− q + 12 ⇐⇒ x > m− q = m− b
y
2c .
Analogously, we obtain x > y + t⇐⇒ x > m− b z2c, and (5) is proved.
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Finally, for rule R3, we have to prove the equivalence in (6):
x > y + z + t ⇐⇒ x > m .
Indeed,
x > y + z + t ⇐⇒ x > n− x ⇐⇒ 2x > 2m+ 1 ⇐⇒ x > m+ 12 ⇐⇒ x > m ,
and we are done.
Proof of Proposition 2.5 The admissibility of the three rules is completely obvious from the
defining inequalities (1), (2) and (3). The order R3 ≤ R2 ≤ R1 as functions T −→ {0, 1} is also
clear, so we focus on the equalities and strict inequalities.
First, we will prove that R2 = R3 for n = 3 (i.e. m = 1). When n = 3, y + z ≤ 3 and this
implies by∧z2 c = 0. According to Proposition 2.2, rules R2 and R3 are the same.
Secondly, for n = 5 (m = 2), we have y + z ≤ 5 and then by∧z2 c ≤ 1. On the points (x, y, z, t)
for which by∧z2 c = 0, the two rules R2 and R3 clearly coincide, by Proposition 2.2. Assume
by∧z2 c = 1. That means y ≥ 2, z ≥ 2, and therefore x ≤ 1. For such points, the value of both
rules is zero. Hence, they coincide everywhere.
To see that R1 > R2 for all n ≥ 3, recall that this inequality means that R1 ≥ R2 and the two
rules are not identical. Consider the point (x, y, z, t) = (1,m,m, 0). On this point, condition (1)
is satisfied, but (2) fails. Therefore, R1(1,m,m, 0) = 1 and R2(1,m,m, 0) = 0.
To show that R2 > R3 for all n ≥ 7 (implying that m ≥ 3), we distinguish two cases, depending
on whether m is even or odd. For an even m ≥ 4, take (x, y, z, t) = (m, m2 , m2 , 1); for m ≥ 3 odd,
take (x, y, z, t) = (m, m+12 ,
m+1
2 , 0). In both cases condition (2) is satisfied and (3) fails.
Proof of Proposition 3.1 For each voter k = 1, . . . , n, let Xk be the random variable taking
values in one of the four possible final decisions of the voter, and let px, py, pz, pt the probability of
each of them. Since these n variables are mutually independent and identically distributed, the
law of the counts (X,Y, Z, T ) is multinomial with parameters (n, px, py, pz, pt). The independence
of the decisions concerning the two premises, gives immediately the particular parameters of the
table, depending on the true state of nature.
Proof of Proposition 4.3 The probability of deciding P ∧ Q for any decision rule can be
computed summing up the multinomial probability function (7) over the set where the rule takes
the value 1. That means, taking into account Proposition 2.2,
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P
{
R1(X,Y, Z, T ) = 1
}
=
n∑
i=0
n−i∑
j=0
n−i−j∑
k=m−i∧j+1
n!
k!j!i!(n− i− j − k)!p
k
xp
j
yp
i
zp
n−i−j−k
t .
P
{
R2(X,Y, Z, T ) = 1
}
=
n∑
i=0
n−i∑
j=0
n−i−j∑
k=m−b 12 i∧jc+1
n!
k!j!i!(n− i− j − k)!p
k
xp
j
yp
i
zp
n−i−j−k
t .
P
{
R3(X,Y, Z, T ) = 1
}
=
n∑
i=0
n−i∑
j=0
n−i−j∑
k=m+1
n!
k!j!i!(n− i− j − k)!p
k
xp
j
yp
i
zp
n−i−j−k
t
=
n∑
k=m+1
(n
k
)
pkx(1− px)n−k .
now using the values of Proposition 3.1 for the case P ∧ Q, we obtain the stated true positive
rates.
Proof of Proposition 4.4 To check the equality in (15), first recall that every admissible deci-
sion rule satisfies R(x, y, z, t) = R(x, y, z, t). Moreover, the law of the random vector (X,Y, Z, T )
under P ∧¬Q, which is multinomial M(n, θ(1− θ), θ2, (1− θ)2, θ(1− θ)), coincides with the law
of (X,Z, Y, T ) under ¬P ∧Q. Therefore,
PP∧¬Q{R(X,Y, Z, T ) = 1} = P¬P∧Q{R(X,Z, Y, T ) = 1} = P¬P∧Q{R(X,Y, Z, T ) = 1} .
For the inequality in the statement, we have, from Proposition 3.1,
PP∧¬Q{R1(X,Y, Z, T ) = 1} =
n∑
i=0
n−i∑
j=0
n−i−j∑
k=m−i∧j+1
(
n
i, j, k, `
)
θn−i+j(1− θ)n+i−j ,
P¬P∧¬Q{R1(X,Y, Z, T ) = 1} =
n∑
i=0
n−i∑
j=0
n−i−j∑
k=m−i∧j+1
(
n
i, j, k, `
)
θ2n−i−j−2k(1− θ)i+j+2k ,
where ` = n − i − j − k. Each term in the first line is greater than the corresponding one
in the second line: θn−i+j(1 − θ)n+i−j > θ2n−i−j−2k(1 − θ)i+j+2k is equivalent to θ2k+2j−n >
(1− θ)2k+2j−n, and this inequality, since θ > 12 , is true provided that 2k + 2j − n > 0. Indeed,
k ≥ m− i ∧ j + 1 ≥ m− j + 1 ⇒ 2k + 2j ≥ 2m+ 2 ⇒ 2k + 2j − n ≥ 1 .
The same argument is valid for R2 and R3, since m− i ∧ j + 1 ≤ m− b i∧j2 c+ 1 ≤ m+ 1. This
completes the proof.
Remark: In fact, one can prove, using a probabilistic coupling argument, that the inequality
PP∧¬Q{R = 1} ≥ P¬P∧¬Q{R = 1} holds true not only for R1, R2, R3, but for any admissible
rule as defined in 2.4. For simplicity, we have restricted ourselves here to prove the statement
as it is.
R session info. Computations have been done in R with the following setup:
R version 3.4.1 (2017-06-30), x86_64-w64-mingw32.
Base packages: base, datasets, graphics, grDevices, stats, utils.
Other packages: knitr 1.17, xtable 1.8-2, compiler 3.4.1, digest 0.6.12, evaluate 0.10.1,
magrittr 1.5, methods 3.4.1, stringi 1.1.6, stringr 1.3.0, tools 3.4.1.
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